Methods of dynamically securing electronic devices and other communications through environmental and system measurements leveraging tailored trustworthy spaces and continuous authentication

ABSTRACT

This invention is for a system capable of securing one or more fixed or mobile computing device and connected system. Each device is configured to change its operating posture by allowing, limiting, or disallowing access to applications, application features, devices features, data, and other information based on the current Tailored Trustworthy Space (TTS) definitions and rules which provided for various situationally dependent scenarios. Multiple TTS may be defined for a given deployment, each of which specifies one or more sensors and algorithms for combining sensor data from the device, other connected devices, and/or other data sources from which the current TTS is identified. The device further achieves security by loading digital credentials through a unidirectional multidimensional physical representation process which allows for the device to obtain said credentials without the risk of compromising the credential issuing system through the data transfer process. This secure system methodology may be used to create a Mobile Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (M-SCIF), among other applications.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This continuation application claims priority to and the benefit of U.S.patent application Ser. No. 14/523,281, entitled Methods of DynamicallySecuring Electronic Devices and Other Communications throughEnvironmental and System Measurements Leveraging Tailored TrustworthySpaces, which was filed on Oct. 24, 2014, which claims priority to U.S.patent application Ser. No. 61/895,020, entitled “Methods of SecuringElectronic Devices And Other Communications,” which was filed on Oct.24, 2013, the disclosures of which are both herein incorporated byreference in their entireties.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The use of a fixed or mobile computing device in an environment withvarying and changing levels of trust, security, and requirements forapplication and data access.

The measurement of hardware and software environmental and systemsensors on a device for the purpose of determining the environment,security, and operational state of a device to provide an understandingof situational awareness and to provide measurements for theidentification of Tailored Trustworthy Spaces (TTS).

The automated adjustment to available application features and data asaccessed by a user or system based on changing conditions of security,location, use, or other parameters. This is the concept known asTailored Trustworthy Spaces (TTS).

The definition of a Context Awareprediction/monitoring/alerting-action/data warehousing system withmethods in near-real time comparison of defined security level scenarios(Tailored Trustworthy Spaces) with user actions and current devicesensor data.

The use of a fixed or mobile computing device in an environment withvarying and changing levels of trust, security and application/dataauthenticated access.

The use of digital credentials for the identification of an electronicdevice or computer, the establishment of trust between computers orelectronic devices, and the establishment of a secure data link betweendevices using Public/Private Key Infrastructure and other cryptologicmethods.

The provisioning of a device with digital credentials which are obtainedfrom a credential authority whereby the device to be provisioned is of aless secure or trusted state than the security and trust state of theissuing authority.

The unidirectional data transfer from a sending secure system to areceiving insecure system (such as from a classified to unclassifiedsystem) whereby the receiver must not be able to introduce any data,code, or other material into the sending system.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

There are existing mobile device security solutions referred to MobileDevice Management (MDM) systems that catalog, assign, track and maintainusers, devices, applications and data at a binary acceptable or notacceptable security level. As the complexity of business and datasecurity increases there are mandates to create a user securityawareness that can react to security policy with multiple varied statesof operation beyond the current binary restriction of allowed ordisallowed.

Applications and systems such as disclosed in U.S. Patent US20080009264,U.S. Pat. No. 7,373,137 and U.S. Pat. No. 8,789,136 define secure eventsand configurations where a device (via communication to a server or inisolation via an internal count down algorithm) determine if the devicesecurity is compromised and thus data and application access should belimited or wiped.

Existing systems do not leverage the increased computational power ofthe modem devices or use methods of onboard sensor data capture andanalysis to produce a contextual awareness of the user, device andassigned security policies. The need for a near real time contextualsystem with predictive support or deterioration of the security statesas represented by multiple sensor readings, other data sources, andalgorithms compared to assigned security policies are required by bothGovernment and Industry.

Electronic systems and devices which are subject to varying conditionsof use, either by virtual of physical mobility or varying access withina given location, are subject to security concerns whereby sensitivedata, application functions, or other information, may be inadvertentlyor purposefully exposed to unauthorized users or entities.

The concept known as Tailored Trustworthy Spaces (TTS) which encompassesthe application of varying levels of security including applicationfeature and data access controls to an electronic system or device basedon the current operating posture of that device.

Security policies are often generated to provide information assuranceand access control, but are often difficult to enforce when they applyto the operation of one or more devices within a system, especially whenthese devices are of a type not subject to physical access control, orof a type which may be moved from the normal location of operation, orof a type which are considered mobile and constantly being moved fromone location to another during normal operations.

Mobile devices, such as modem cell phones, tablets, watches, and others,often contain environmental sensors which may be used to measure,determine, or infer the nature and extent of user interaction with thedevice, or the operational condition or environment of the device. Nonmobile devices (desktop computers, servers, and other equipment), whilenot normally fitted with such sensors, may also contain such sensorswhich may be added as peripherals, or which may be included in futuredesigns of such systems.

Digital certificates are a type of digital credential which is used foruser/device identification, the encrypting of data and communications,and the signing of data.

Existing systems do not have a suitable method for loading digitalcredentials from a secure sender to an insecure receiver withoutincluding a vulnerability whereby the insecure receiver wouldpotentially be able to exploit vulnerabilities in the secure sender and,among other things, inject unwanted or unauthorized code or data intothe sender system.

OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION

It is an object of this invention to provide a methodology to beimplemented in an electronic system or device which allows for thedynamic varying of operating capabilities, including applicationfunctions, data access, device features, and the protection of otherinformation, based upon measurements made by the system of the immediateand distant surroundings from which an assessment of the securityposture of that system may be measured within some mathematical degreeof certainty, from which the identification of one or more TailoredTrustworthy Spaces (TTS) are identified, and the appropriate data andapplication access and controls are applied. This object will bereferred through this document as a secure system methodology, with thevarious components described being the numerous parts of the securitysystem.

It is an object of this invention to provide a measurement of theoperational state (security, user interaction, location, environmentalconditions, etc.) of the device using one or more sensors or data feedslocated on the device or otherwise attached to the device (either as acabled or wireless peripheral) or otherwise made available to the devicebut not directly connected to and not necessarily in the immediatevicinity of the device (as an external data source connected by somenetwork).

It is an object of this invention to provide a unidirectional means oftransferring digital credential information and/or other data from asecure system to a less secure system, thereby allowing data to betransferred without the risk of the receiving device compromising thesecurity of the sending system.

It is an object of this invention to provide a unidirectional means oftransferring digital information, including device or systemconfiguration information, user preference information, or any otherinformation, along with or independent of the transfer of the digitalcredential information.

It is an object of this invention to provide a means of creating amobile Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF) systemthrough the use of multiple devices secured using this invention andwith additional components.

Still other objects and advantages of the invention will in part beobvious and will in part be apparent from the specification anddrawings.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The invention accordingly comprises the several steps and the relationof one or more of such steps with respect to each of the others, and theapparatus embodying features of construction, combinations of elementsand arrangement of parts that are adapted to affect such steps, all isexemplified in the following detailed disclosure, and the scope of theinvention will be indicated in the claims.

The invention describes a methodology for the incorporation of TailoredTrustworthy Spaces (TTS) into mobile and fixed devices which may beeither independent or a part of a larger system. A means for definingthe various TTS, the handling of various security states based ontransitions from one TTS to another, and the various actions of thesetransitions is defined.

A means for incorporating onboard device hardware and software sensors,peripheral sensors, and data from sources external to the devices isprovided within the secure system methodology. On device process ofsensor data for TTS state identification and computation independent ofexternal devices may be performed. Conversely, or in unison, sensor dataor TTS measurements from multiple devices may be transmitted to a devicewhich can combine the various measurements of multiple devices to createan overall TTS measurement representing the security state of a set ofmultiple devices.

Single or multiple TTS policies can govern the user access of devicesensors, applications, data or device functions with dynamic alerts ordevice actions (including selective wipe (keys or keys and data),complete wipe, etc.). Non-mobile devices which may normally not containbuilt in sensors (desktop computers, servers and other equipment), mayalso be connected to the system with peripheral sensors or specializedhardware.

The system may employ a method of loading digital certificates from asecure sender to less secure or insecure device for the purposes ofsecuring communication of user/device identification and authentication,application communication, data at rest storage, information assurance,and data signing. The method supports a unidirectional communication tolimit exposure of the secure sending system to unauthorized injectionsof code or data.

In order to provide a means for an electronic system/device to adjustits security posture, including access to various application features,data, and other information, based on its current operating posture,optionally including measurements and data from other systems anddevices, it is necessary to design a system which is capable of takinglocal measurements of its surroundings, extracting meaningfulinformation from these measurements regarding its current operatingposture, applying this meaningful information and optionally externallysupplied information to a set of rules, and based on those rules,performing the necessary actions to limit or allow access toapplications, data, or other information within the system or device.

The various components of the invention may be further incorporated intoa mobile secure compartmentalized information facility (M-SCIF)providing features including active noise cancelation, anelectromagnetically shielded RF tent, voice scrambling, securecommunication, and electromagnetic countermeasures including signaljamming.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the invention, reference is made tothe following description and accompanying drawings, in which thefollowing is presented:

FIG. 1 is an example of a particular definition of a TTS measurementexpressed in XML format;

FIG. 2 is an example of how multiple TTS measurement definitions may beused to define various TTS states of the system and a particularapplication as expressed in XML format;

FIG. 3 is an example of the flow of the on device processing of audiodata from the audio FFT source (marked with S) through various filters(marked with F), resulting in multiple measurements (marked with M).Note that the result of a filter may be used multiple times for multiplepurposes, automatically operating at the minimum data rate required tosatisfy all of the dependent consumers of data.

FIG. 4 depicts the various components of one potential implementation ofthe secure system methodology as deployed on a device;

FIG. 5 depicts the various security states of one potentialimplementation of the secure system methodology;

FIG. 6 depicts the various security states of one potentialimplementation of the secure system methodology;

FIG. 7 The various security states of one potential implementation ofthe secure system methodology;

FIG. 8 depicts the various security states of one potentialimplementation of the secure system methodology;

FIG. 9 depicts one potential implementation of the secure systemmethodology as used in a multiple device TTS system. TTS measurementsfrom both a mobile device and desktop computer create a security stateof the two device system which is analyzed and acted upon by aenterprise wide security server.

FIG. 10 depicts the procedural flow for out of band security credentialsloading;

FIG. 11 depicts an implementation of the secure system methodology whichprovides for a Mobile Secure Compartmented Intelligence Facility(M-SCIF); and

FIG. 12 depicts a diagram of the components of the router box used inthe M-SCIF implementation of the secure system methodology.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

The TTS measurement definitions, rules and actions may be describedwithin secure system methodology in any machine readable data format. Asan example, a TTS definition for a particular measurement definitionencoded in XML format is presented in FIG. 1.

A TTS definition is given a name which can be referenced in TTS rulesrequiring this definition. It lists one or more measurement datasources, which can either be a hardware sensor, software sensor,external data source, or some combined result of multiple sensors. Thevalue of the sensor output may be scaled, used raw, or assigned a valueby taking the raw value and applying it to a continuous function, stepfunction, or another algorithm. Parameters specific to the sensor beingused may be passed to the sensor configuration. As a sensor may not beavailable on a particular device, a default value for a sensor to takewhen the sensor is not present on the device may be optionallyspecified. When multiple sensors are used in a TTS definition, acalculation method describing how the values from each sensor should becombined to produce a numerical results for the TTS definition isprovided. A TTS measurement may take sensor values and/or other TTSmeasurement output values as input

The configuration of the secure system includes in part a description ofthe various TTS measurements along with the actions to take whenparticular measurements achieve certain values, and may be representedin any machine readable data format. As an example, an excerpt of asecure system configuration encoded in XML format is presented in FIG.2.

The example configuration includes a list of applications available tothe device, and an application entry within that list including a numberof TTS rules. Each TTS rule includes the named TTS definition that isused to provide a value for the rule, an action with the system to takewhen the value meets certain criteria, and a set of criterial, usuallyrepresented as a threshold or a range of allowed values of the TTSmeasurement for which the TTS rule applies.

TTS rules may be defined within the system as a system wide rule(controlling the general operation of the device including device lockand wipe capabilities) or may be specific to individual applications(for instance allowing viewing of an address book within acommunications application), particular data types within an application(for instance viewing home phone numbers of contacts within an addressbook), various features on a device (such as a camera) or variouscommunication methods of a device (such as cellular calling capability).

A TTS Manager component is used within the system to efficiently performthe necessary TTS measurements as required throughout the entire system,ensuring that the processing of data is minimized by reusing resultsacross various measurement consumers. An example of a segment of thesteps in performing the TTS measurements for audio spectrum data isgiven as an example in FIG. 3.

A single instance of an audio FFT data source is used for the entire setof TTS measurements requiring audio frequency data ([FIG. 3]). Variousmeasurements may be extracted at different points in the processingchain ([FIG. 3-2], [FIG. 3-4], [FIG. 3-6], and [FIG. 3-10]), withvarious data transformations and processing taking place at differentpoints along the chain ([FIG. 3-3], [FIG. 3-5], [FIG. 3-7], [FIG. 3-8],and [FIG. 3-9]). At each point in the chain, any data processingperformed occurs at a rate which is minimum that is required to satisfythe constraints of all downstream data processors, thus minimizingcomputational and power load on the device performing the processing.

One potential implementation of the secure system methodology ispresented in FIG. 4. In this implementation, the electronic device to besecured is in the form of a mobile device, as presented in [FIG. 4-2].Component objects shown within that device may be implemented in somecombination of hardware, software, or firmware. Prior to using themobile device within the system, the user must first load a securitycredential (here in the form of a digital certificate) onto that device.The Certificate Server [FIG. 4-1] maintains a list of authorized userswithin the system and provides a repository for user credentials in theform of X.509 Certificates or in other forms providing authenticationand encryption capabilities. The certificate is loaded through some outof band process ([FIG. 4-3]) into a certificate store on the device([FIG. 4-4]) where it is encrypted with a user supplied password,biometric password, or some other key known to the device user toprovide user directed locking/unlocking of the keystore.

The System/Configuration Server [FIG. 4-5] provides configurationin-formation to the device, and the device accesses this informationover a connection which may be encrypted (such as, but not limited to,HTTPS/TLS or SSL) during a Configuration Process [FIG. 4-6]. Theconfiguration information is used to configure the device and includes,but is not limited to, information regarding the connection details ofapplication servers ([FIG. 4-7]) and information defining device wideTTS rules and actions. Information pertaining to the configuration ofspecific applications is handled by the Application Store [FIG. 4-10]which in addition to managing application configurations in theApplication Definitions [FIG. 4-11] may optionally also holdindividually compartmentalized application containers. The applicationservers may be independent (providing compartmentalized and siloedapplication server instances) or operating on the same systems andinfrastructure as the configuration server. The configuration server hasno knowledge of the purpose, code, data, or specific TTS rules of anapplication, and only has TTS rules required to allow the applicationdownload to the device and the application launch.

The partitioning of the various components within the device may beaccomplished programmatically and within a single executing program,through the use multiple modules on a single operating system, throughthe use of multiple virtual machines on a single hardware platform,through the use of multiple hardware components or connected hardwareplatforms, or using any combination of the above.

Most mobile devices contain a microphone, accelerometer and back facingcamera, and many will also have a front facing camera, light sensor,proximity sensor, and temperature sensor. These common sensors, alongwith device specific sensors, and peripheral sensors, may be used inpart to generate TTS measurements.

An example of an audio based TTS measurement is as follows. A DiscreteFourier Transform (DFT) is applied to audio sampled at 44, 100 Hz toprovide frequency spectrum information from 10 to 5000 Hz in bins with10 Hz resolution. An ambient noise level is measured as the total powerin all frequency bins. The spectrum information is often processedthrough a triangle smoother. The ambient peak frequency and associatedpeak power is measured. A white or pink noise detection algorithm isused to identify if white or pink noise is present, and determining ifrequirements of average power level and power distribution among thefrequency bins are met. A capability for detecting if an alarm issounding, by specifying a frequency range, minimum sounding time, andminimum duty cycle, is provided.

Additional measurements are taken after the data is further processedthrough peak finding and peak minimum power threshold filters. Harmonicgroupings of peaks are formed, where a fundamental frequency isidentified along with the presence of one or more harmonic peaks. Alimit on the deviation of the harmonics from perfect integer multiplesmay be specified. One or more harmonic groups may be found in a sample,with the harmonics being assigned to the fundamental frequencies whichare closest matches.

An attempt may be made to identify human voices using the harmonic data.On the principal that much of human speech, especially open vowelsounds, are generated in the throat and have a rich set of harmonicovertones, it may be possible to identify one or more potential speakersbased on varying fundamental frequency and a restriction on harmonicswhich must be present. Once potential voices are identified, a slidingtime window of 40 seconds is used where the voices are examined foroverlap or alternating periods of pausing and vocalizing. The former mayindicate periods of non-human voice noise, or otherwise noisy area withmuch speech, while the latter may indicate actual conversation.

Measurements are taken to indicate the detection of no voices, thedetection of one or more voices (where the number of detected voices isreported), the presence of conversational voices (where the number ofvoices in the conversation is presented), and the presence ofoverlapping voices (where the number of voices overlapping ispresented). A fundamental frequency and standard deviation may beconfigured which represents the fundamental frequency that is typical ofthe device owner voice (assuming a Gaussian distribution), such that ameasurement of the probability that a voice consistent with the ownersvoice is detected may be provided.

An example of a motion TTS measurement is as follows. The accelerometeris used to measure both movement of the device and movement of the user.A simple measurement is made to determine if the device is dropped froma height or tossed out at an angle near or above the horizon, and if so,how far the device falls. This measurement relies on the underlyingaccelerometer hardware and operating system implementation, and so theaccuracy of the distance measured may not be consistent even though aclear indication of a fall or toss is gathered.

All additional measurements rely on sliding window Discrete FourierTransform (DFT) which measure frequency and power information from 0 to25 Hz in bins with resolution of 0.2 Hz. regarding device movement inboth device and global coordinate systems along the x, y, z axis, in thexy, yz, xz planes, as a magnitude in all dimensions xyz, and as arotation along the x, y, z axis.

In the device coordinate system, measurements are made to indicate userinitiated actions, such as device shake, rotate, and flip.

In the global coordinate system, the goal is to identify the movement ofthe user in his environment, including pedestrian or mechanized movement(either powered or unpowered). Measurements are made along the global z,xy plane, and xy rotation, with 12 variables generated from thefrequency and power information contained in these spectrums. Alog-likelihood function is used, along with trained data, to makeprobability estimates that the device is still on a table, or that thedevice is being carried by a user who is either standing, walking whilereading, walking with the device at his side, running in a straightline, running in a zig-zag (or evasive) pattern, or normally or quicklywalking up and down a flight of stairs. The ability to take bothinstantaneous and time averaged measurements of the user movementprovides insight not only to the status of the device, but the status ofthe user holding the device.

Some other TTS measurement examples are as follows. Other sensors arepresent on many devices which provide for additional measurements. Thefront facing camera may record the number of human faces detected as ameans to see if one or more persons are actively looking at the screen.The light sensor may provide a measurement of whether the user is insideor outside of a building, and when combined with the current backlightsensor, indicates the potential for an actor to view the screen over theowner's shoulder. A temperature measurement provides ambienttemperature. When coupled together, the temperature and light sensorcould provide a means of confirming user location when outside based onexpected weather reports. The proximity sensor allows for the owner toprovide direct input to the device by either covering or exposing thatsensor. A measurement of the screen state as either off, locked, orshowing something other than the secure system user interface provides arisk measurement of screen observation. GPS, network based, and otherlocation measurements may also be implemented.

An example TTS situation with regards to viewing the device screen,describing the measurements that may be used to detect a given userenvironment and risk profile, is as follows. The screen state indicatesif the user is currently viewing a component of the platform. If so, itmay be required that the screen brightness relative to the ambient lightlevel is low enough such that the screen is not easily read from adistance. The detection of a face at least once every ten seconds mightbe required to ensure that the user is actively working with the device.The user might be required to place the device down or to stand (but notto run) in order to fully access all features of the application.

An example TTS situation with regards to secure VOIP, describing themeasurements that may be used to detect a given user environment andrisk profile, is as follows. A voice conversation utilizing VOIP betweenthis device and another device might only be started when the ambientsound level is sufficiently loud and the ambient sound has a profile ofwhite or pink noise, as to mediate any potential eavesdropping. The usermight be prohibited from placing the device down, and the voicedetection must identify at least one voice, the loss of either of whichwould cause the call to automatically end.

An example TTS situation with regards to detecting device loss,describing the measurements that may be used to detect a given userenvironment and risk profile, is as follows. Device loss may be adeliberate or an accidental action, either of which should at minimallock the device certificate and keystore, immediately preventing securedata and network access, and resulting in the unloading of theapplications and corresponding application and VOIP configurations.Intentional loss may be indicated by a shaking of the device or atossing of the device into the air. Accidental loss might be indicatedby the dropping of the device from a height, or the abandonment of thedevice (where it remains still for a time and no faces or userrecognized voice is observed).

The methodology described may be implemented on any type of device. Thefollowing describes an implementation on an Android device as anapplication. The secure system is provided as an Android applicationdistributed within an APK, but as such, does not contain any secureinformation. Most applications, and all settings, are loaded into theprogram after installation on the target device. However, someapplication code may be distributed with the APK, for instance if it isfor an application that will be available to most or all users of thesystem. The device interacts with authorized servers by presenting anX509 Certificate which is assigned to the user and specific device. Thiscertificate allows the device to authenticate with a configurationserver which provides the settings required to load applications andother features of the platform on the device. Including applicationconfigurations, VOIP configurations, and TTS measurement definition andaction rules for the above, the configuration file is downloaded whenrequired. All applications in this platform take the form of HTML5/CSS3web applications which are rendered in separate and independent WebViewcomponents for each application. Through the use ofWebViewClient.shouldinterceptRequest, all application file access andcommunication is tightly controlled. All network requests are passedthrough this interface, allowing the secure system to allow or disallowconnection to the corresponding application server or other destinationsdepending on TTS rules. All requests for data files are also interceptedthrough this method, allowing TTS rules to be applied to specific typesof data access, and allowing for data at rest to be decrypted on the flyand to remain decrypted in memory only for the duration that it isrequired for user interaction and display. Application specific filesmay be included in the distributed APK if the exposure of such is not asecurity concern. In most cases, the files would instead be provided bythe application server across an HTTPS/TLS connection in the form of atar file. The tar file may contain both unencrypted and AES256 encryptedfiles, the contents and encryption key of which may be unique to thepresented device certificate. The key may be removed or reloaded fromthe device without removing the secure files to minimize the networkbandwidth required to make the secure data available.

Following the example of the APK implementation for Android OS Devices,the system in that instance may take on the following security statesItems beginning with a ‘*’ require user intervention. The rest of thesteps may automatically transition either down or up the list, dependingon the TTS measurements and rules that have been specified. Eachapplication and VOIP have separate TTS rules, and may take on a securitystate different and independent of the other system components. Deviceshutdown or reboot, either initiated by the user or by a low batterystate, causes the platform to automatically revert to state 3.

-   -   1. *Stock Device, APK unloaded    -   2. *APK loaded    -   3. *Device Certificate loaded (encrypted)    -   4. *Device Certificate loaded (unencrypted)    -   5. Application and VOIP configurations loaded    -   6. Application files loaded/VOW module enabled    -   7. Application secure data key loaded and files accessible/VOIP        incoming/outgoing call enabled    -   8. Application viewable in application list    -   9. Application launch enabled in application list    -   10. Application specific behavior varies based on TTS        Measurements/VOIP calls may be automatically dropped based on        TTS Measurements

An implementation of Secure VOIP may be included with the platform. Aparticular example of such an implementation is described here. A SecureSIP server with TLS encryption may be used. A method to MIKEY, whereeach call initiation handshake includes SDP information containing TTSsecurity information, may be used. A single use X509 key signed by thedevice certificate is used to established identity and to provide apublic key to the peer for encrypting the contents of the SDP message. Asingle use AES256 key is also transmitted by each of the peers for usein securing the VOIP call. The SDP message is finally signed by thecertificate to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The use of single usecertificates and encryption keys provides forward security withouthaving a requirement that security information be stored betweensessions. The secure VOIP data connection may be achieved with a variantof SRTP, where an additional channel specification is added to allow forthe transmissions of TTS data. Thus, not only can the platform makedecisions about ending a call automatically based on local devicesecurity measurements, but can also factor in the measurements beingmade on the peer device.

The platform may also include the ability to allow for other keyexchange mechanisms found in other communication implementations. If amethod such as Diffie-Hellman is to be used, where security informationfrom prior sessions must be stored, then a means of securely storingthat information with the ability to unlock that information quicklyenough to establish a call must be provided. A key store for thispurpose may be created which stores the security information encryptedwith AES256 on the local storage. This information may be decrypted asrequired so long as the device certificate remains available. The momentthat the unencrypted device certificate is purged due to TTS rules, theVOIP security information becomes unavailable until the user unlocks thedevice certificate and associated PKCS12 store.

When multiple devices take part in a communication, including but notlimited to, voice, video, text, email, etc., information about eachdevices security state, TTS state, and configuration, may be includedwithin the body or header of the message or messaging protocol of themessage or as a separate message transmitted independently of thecommunication message over the same or different data transportmechanism to the device or devices taking part in the communication.Such an inclusion of TTS information allows for each endpoint andintermediate device involved in the communication to make its ownmeasurements using TTS measurement data from itself and other devices tocreate a system wide understanding of the security state of a system.For instance, this would allow a mobile phone to end a phone call basedon rules which take measurements from the other phone endpoint andintermediate network routing equipment. The compromising of the physicalsecurity of a router box (perhaps by the opening of the rack cabinet)could create a measurement that is used as a signal by an endpoint phoneto terminate the call.

Device hardware control may be implemented on the platform by grantingthe application device administration access. This allows the device todisable the camera, perform a device lock, or perform a data wipe. Suchactions may be taken based on TTS rules. Other device settings may beset through the platform and TTS rules, such as ringer volume and screenbrightness. Such settings are not able to be locked out from usermodification, but may be checked and updated periodically. The VOIPmodule ringer is independent of the device ringer that is used forregular calls and is fully controllable.

A standard concern of deploying portable devices is that of interfacingwith trusted hardware out of a concern that a compromised externaldevice could introduce a vulnerability into the enterprise system. TheX509 Certificate loaded on the device must be placed there in a secureway. As the mobile device typically does not have a means of loading acertificate securely (such as via a smart card), a method may be usedfor an out of band unidirectional certificate transfer mechanism throughthe use of QR codes.

The typical deployment of such a system would involve a userauthenticating with a standard desktop system which is equipped forhardware token authentication (ie: CAC). Once authenticated, anapplication can be run which generates an X509 certificate unique forthe user and mobile device combination, which is signed by and chainedwith the users regular certificate. This new certificate has a limitedlifespan (perhaps on the order of a work day) and would be registeredwith a certificate server which supports the SMP deployment. Displayedon the users desktop as one or more QR codes, the PKCS12 keystore,containing the mobile certificate and associated private key, is loadedonto the mobile device through the use of the hardware camera. Onceloaded, the PKCS12 store is encrypted with AES256 and stored on themobile device. Methods of encryption may include a user specified passcode or a hardware token such as a randomly generated short term use QRcode or a RFID hardware token. The certificate generally remains inmemory, allowing for seamless usage. When it occasionally is purged frommemory due to TTS restrictions, it can be decrypted and reloaded throughthe use of the passcode or hardware token without having to repeat theoriginal QR code loading. This method successfully allows for thetransfer of security information in the form of a certificate from atrusted desktop to a less trusted mobile device.

An application server may provide a means to allow the specification ofa location of application files, location of a key store, and API forclient requests for application specific data. Any files placed withinthe application file directory can be automatically bundled into a tarfile and sent to the client upon application configuration. Files placedin a secure directory will can be encrypted prior to bundling with a keygenerated for that particular bundle request. The key that is generatedis stored in the application key store so that a mobile device may purgethe key and not the data, and reload the key at a later time. Thismethod allows for the secure storing of data on the mobile device whilelimiting the data transfer to recover the secure data to that associatedwith restoring the encryption key.

Both the System/Configuration Server [FIG. 4-5] and Application Server[FIG. 4-7] connect to the Certificate Server [FIG. 4-1] over aconnection which may be encrypted (such as, but not limited to,HTTPS/TLS or SSL) [FIG. 4-9] for the purposes of updating the status ofauthenticated users throughout the system. For instance, if the digitalcredentials used to identify a user within the system changes then thatchange would be reflected upon the various servers which would beidentifying connections from the device to the server using the updatedcredentials. This allows for various servers to be aware of certificaterevocation and other changes to user certificate information.

One or more application servers [FIG. 4-7] provide application specificconfiguration information, TTS definitions and rules, data encryptionkeys, data, user interface and application code to a specificcompartmentalized application container on the device [FIG. 4-12]. Theapplication information is transferred from the application server tothe device over a connection which may be encrypted (using methodsincluding, but not limited to, HTTPS/TLS or SSL) [FIG. 4-8].

Each compartmentalized application container [FIG. 4-12] containsmultiple parts including: an Application View [FIG. 4-13] which providesa separately executing textual or graphical user interface code allowingthe user to interact with the application code and data corresponding tothe application independent of and isolated from any other executingcode on the system; a set of Application TTS Definitions [FIG. 4-14]which define application specific measurements and security rulessurrounding the application; an Application Key Storage [FIG. 4-15]which stores application specific encryption credentials for data storedon the device or transferred to the application server; a set ofApplication User Interface Code [FIG. 4-16] code which defines theinterface for the user, including application specific algorithms, datarendering, and data editing/entry; a set of application specificApplication Secure Data [FIG. 4-17] which is stored on the deviceencrypted using the application specific data encryption keys (data atrest) and is decrypted only as required for display within theapplication specific executing view code [FIG. 4-13].

Each compartmentalized application container has access to thecertificate store Application Access to Certificate Store [FIG. 4-18]for the purpose of obtaining the current user identification certificatefor establishing connections to the various application servers.

A separately executing textual or graphical user interface code ispresented to the user as [FIG. 4-19] and through connections to theapplication store and compartmentalized application containers [FIG.4-20] is able to provide a status of the various application containersto the user, and allows the user to select one or more applicationcontainers to interact with (i.e. to display on the screen). The variousapplication containers generally can continue to execute applicationcode even if not currently displayed on the screen. The availableapplications presented as choices are limited to those allowed bycurrent TTS rules. If a TTS rule is applied which would prevent accessto the currently viewed application, then the screen can automaticallyreturn back to this selection screen, to another currently runningapplication, or another screen (the actual action being implementationand configuration dependent).

The system includes the ability to incorporate a secure VOIP or othercommunication modules [FIG. 4-21] which is controlled by one or moreapplication containers through Secure VOIP Application Interface [FIG.4-22]. The VOIP or other communication modules has a separate key store[FIG. 4-23] which provides security information for the encryption ofthe communications ([FIG. 4-24]).

A TTS Manager and Event Handler [FIG. 4-25] monitors the varioushardware and software sensors Sensor Inputs [FIG. 4-26] through theconnection Sensor Connections [FIG. 4-27]. It configures the sensors asrequired for the measurements that have been requested by the variousTTS consumers (application store, application container, secure VOIP,etc.) to make the only the necessary measurements and the minimumrequired sampling rate (unneeded sensors are not used or activated)providing optimal power usage. When the TTS measurements satisfy rulechanges which change the secure posture of the device, the TTS managernotifies the consumers to change their operating state accordingly(Application TTS Connection [FIG. 4-30]).

The TTS manager can also directly cause hardware actions on the device(such as screen lock, shutdown, device wipe, vibration, graphical,visual (screen notification or indicator light) and/or noisenotification, etc.) through the Hardware Actions [FIG. 4-28] whichconnects to the TTS manager via Hardware Action Control [FIG. 4-29]. TTSrules are those which define one or more sensor inputs, one or morealgorithms which are used to process the sensor input data, and one ormore criteria or methods of processing the algorithm output for thedetermination of the applicability of said TTS rule. As an example, aTTS rule might be used to specify microphone as a sensor input, specifyan algorithm which measures the overall background noise level in aroom, and indicate that the TTS rule applies when the overall backgroundnoise level in the room exceeds some predetermined value. That TTS rulemay then be used by the event handler to prevent or to interrupttelephone calls when the TTS rule is found to not apply, as there is aperceived increased risk of eavesdropping by a third party when theambient sound level in the room falls below the value specified by thatparticular TTS rule.

The device state and raw TTS measurements may optionally be directlyreported to a server (Server TTS Connection [FIG. 4-31]). This allowsfor the generation of an expanded secure system, where decisions onsoftware, data, and other item access restrictions can be made at alevel involving TTS measurements from multiple devices. For instance amobile phone assigned to a user and a desktop computer in an office,also assigned to that same user, may both send live TTS measurementinformation to a server which can combine the results to compute themobile/desktop TTS state. A mobile device and desktop computer which areboth in use in different physical locations with the same usercredentials would be an indicator that one or both devices are not beingoperated by the same authorized user.

The system may take on one or more different security states dependingon the defined TTS rules and the current TTS and operating state of thesystem, as illustrated in FIG. 5. The states may move freely from onestate to another following the paths of the directed arrows as thesecurity posture of the system changes. This changing of state ensuresthat in the event of a device security breach, the amount of informationavailable for exploit is at a minimum, mitigating any successful attack.

The first state of the system is when the system is installed on thedevice (System Installed on Device [FIG. 5-1]). The device to be securedmay be obtained with this secure system already installed, or it may beinstalled by the organization owning or controlling the device, or bythe device owner or end user. When the secure system is installed on thedevice, it may be done as part of the device operating system (such asan extension to the underlying Linux OS or the Android OS on an androiddevice) or as an application within the device operating system (such asan APK on an android device). When first installed, the system has noinformation loaded regarding configuration, TTS, applications, useridentification, etc. A keystore is then loaded onto the device (KeystoreLoaded onto Device [FIG. 5-2]), which includes at a minimum the securitycredentials necessary to authenticate with a configuration server andinformation about the identity of the configuration server (such ashostname or IP address, port, and protocol information). While in thisstate, the device has all of the necessary information to reach all ofthe remaining security states of the system, provided that access to theconfiguration server may be established. The keystore is a componentwhich can security store keys on the device in some encrypted format.The keystore can be locked, preventing access to the keys, or unlocked,allowing access to the keys. The locking mechanism can be some userspecified directed (a password, biometric, etc.), a hardware token (SIMcard, NFC token, etc.), or some other equivalent method. Once thekeystore is unlocked (Keystore unlocked [FIG. 5-3]), the system is ableto access the credentials to access the configuration server. Once theconfiguration of the secure system has been retrieved from theconfiguration server (Configuration Loaded [FIG. 5-4]), the necessaryinformation about the TTS definitions and operation and securityparameters of the system have been the loaded and the various user tasksof the system may commence. The information obtained from theconfiguration server includes the system wide TTS definition and rules,a list of available application with information necessary to load eachapplication (including application specific TTS definition and rulesregarding application listing, loading, and execution), device featureTTS definition and rules, and communication method TTS definition andrules. The system can then enter a state of standard operations beingenabled (Operation State [FIG. 5-5]). This is a state in which thesecure system may now be viewed as being divided into three categories:those dealing with running secured applications, those dealing withusing the various features of the device, and those detailing withcommunication with other devices and users. These various categories mayoperate in various security states so long as the main system remains inthis operations enabled state. The files and configuration may beunloaded (All Configurations and Files Unloaded [FIG. 5-6]), alsoremoving all information regarding the applications, device features,and communication methods. This prevents sensitive information aboutthese aspects of the system from being available to a device attack.These items may be reinitialized through a reloading of theconfiguration. The keystore may be locked, preventing access to theconfiguration loading (Keystore Loaded [FIG. 5-7]), until the userunlocks the store. The keystore may be removed from the device, furtherpreventing any possible access to the keys contained therein (Keystoreremoved from device [FIG. 5-8]). The secure system may be removed fromthe device, preventing any trace of the existence of the secure systemshould the device be compromised or subject to analysis (Systemuninstalled from device [FIG. 5-9]).

While in an operations enabled state, the vanous configured applicationscan independently have its own set of TTS rules defined, and as such,the security state for individual applications may be different thanother applications and are not required to be related to or to interactwith the security states of the other applications. Each applicationstarts in a state with the application files unloaded (Application FilesUnloaded [FIG. 6-A1]). This state may be omitted in systems which do notuse external application servers, in which cases the application filesremain on the device as part of the secure system installation. Theapplication files are the files necessary to run the application (theexecutable code), along with other information which is not consideredapplication configuration information, but may include fixed constantsof the application including network specifications (server and protocolidentifications, etc.), and other information. The purpose of allowingthe application files to be unloaded provides a level of security thatif the system were to be compromised while in this state, littleinformation about the nature of the application, its purpose, itscapabilities, etc., would not be exposed to the attack. The applicationfiles necessary for the execution of the application are then loaded(Application Files Loaded [FIG. 6-A2]). Data within the application maybe categories into one or more types, with each data type potentiallyhaving its own TTS rules and encryption keys. The application may befurther restricted by removing the data encryption key associated withthe application data from the device ([FIG. 6-DI]), preventing anyaccess to the application data by an attack on the data storage,essentially provided data at rest protection. An application specificdata encryption key for a particular data type (Data Encryption KeyLoaded [FIG. 6-D2]) is loaded from the application server. This key isuser/device specific and is used to encrypt data at rest on the device.The purpose of this key is to allow for encrypted data on the device toremain on the device in a secure way. The data encryption key may bepurged from the device, but the encrypted data may remain, allowing forthe fast re-access of the encrypted data (by reloading the key from theserver) without the need to remove the sensitive data from the device.Data may be initially not stored on the device (Data Not Stored onDevice [FIG. 6-D5]) and may be loaded and store on the device in anencrypted state when required (Data Stored on Device Encrypted [FIG.6-D4]). When both the corresponding encrypted data is stored on thedevice and the necessary encryption key to decrypted the stored data isloaded, the unencrypted data may be made available for applicationaccess and modification (Unencrypted Data Available to Application [FIG.6-D3]). Note that the data key states and corresponding data storagestates for a particular type of data are independent of each other. Anapplication may be made available for display to the user as anavailable application in a list of applications ([FIG. 6-A3]). Ifapplication launch is enabled (Application Launch Enabled [FIG. 6-A4]).The application is not only viewable to the user, but may also belaunched/executed by the user. Once launched, the application codebegins execution (Normal Application Execution and Termination [FIG.6-A5]) and may be normally terminated as part of the applicationsprogramming or by user direction. While in this state, the applicationmay remain displayed on the screen and available for user interaction,or may be run as a background process, or as an alternation between auser visible foreground and a background process. An application inlaunch enabled ([FIG. 6-A4]) or running state ([FIG. 6-A5]) maytransition to a Application Halted/Launch Disabled [FIG. 6-A6] state,though with any running instance of the application is immediatelyterminated and the launching of the application is prevented. Theapplication may be further restricted by removing the application fromthe list of available application ([FIG. 6-A7]).

The application may then be further restricted by the full removal ofapplication data and application executable code from the system(Application Files Unloaded [FIG. 6-A1]), preventing any analysis of theapplication by an attacker (as the device at this point has absolutelyno information about the application).

The secure system may also be used to protect various features of adevice. A device feature is any aspect of a device excluding securedapplications and communications, and may include but is not limited to,the ability to: operate a camera to take a picture, operate a microphoneto record audio, unlock the device, charge the device, use the device asa NFC payment device, allow user directed software installation andremoval, allow the user to change system level configuration of thedevice (including network, security, audio, haptic feedback, and othersystem level configurations), etc. Once in the operation state ([FIG.7-1]), each device feature may take its own security state which may bemost strictly limited with the feature being disabled ([FIG. 7-B1]), thefeature being partially enabled, with certain aspects of the featurerestricted or disabled ([FIG. 7-B2]), or with the feature being fullyenabled ([FIG. 7-B3]).

The various TTS rules and configurations which cause the control,direction, manipulation, limitation, activation or deactivation of thevarious security states of the system, application features, data,device features, communication features, and any other states may bedefined for any purpose not limited to security and specificallyincluding, but not limited to, regulatory and user safety requirements.For example, a regulation may prevent a commercial truck driver frommaking personal phone calls or text messaging on a cellular device whilethe vehicle is in motion and traveling over a certain speed (movementawareness) and on federally regulated roadways (position and locationawareness). A secure system on the cellular device may prevent personalphone calls when such conditions are met. As a second example, aregulation may prevent a driver from driving a truck for more than 8hours in a 24 hour period. A secure system on the truck can performdriver identification (facial and biometric identification) and duty dayaccounting, and prevent engine start or limit maximum speed if thevehicle is already running once the duty day for a specific driver isexceeded. Both regulatory examples may be enforced in systemsimplementing the secure system methodology. Furthermore, the securesystem on the truck could act in a capacity to ensure system user safetyby providing one or more sensors to physically monitor the truck driverfor signs of fatigue (for instance, sensors could include those capableof measuring body temperature, facial expression, body position, andreaction time). If driver fatigue was detected, the system could soundan alarm or annunciator, send a message to the dispatcher, limit thespeed of the truck, or cause any other action. A secure system on a foodstorage refrigeration trailer may enhance consumer safety by preventingthe unlocking and opening of the trailer when it is not at a specifiedand authenticated warehouse, when the temperature of the environmentoutside the trailer doors exceeds some threshold (temperature sensor todetermine likelihood of food spoilage), when people outside the trailerwho intend to open the trailer to unload it have fevers (thermal imagingsensor to sense potential health danger or contamination hazard formaterial handling), and for other purposes. A consumer safetyimplementation may prevent the use of a cellular phone while in thedriver's seat of a personal vehicle, but not while in the passengerseat. Such a safety system may be implemented using a secure system onthe mobile device, or by using a secure system integrated in the vehicleor as an aftermarket add-on within the vehicle which can sense deviceposition, determine the nature of the call (phone number), determine thesituation of the vehicle (is it parked, driving, etc.), determine ifthere is an emergency (sounds or motion of a crash, etc.), and which canoperate signal modification hardware to either allow the device activityor to block the device activity through the disruption, jamming, orother modification of the localized device data connection. This systemmight allow calls to an emergency number to be made by any phone withinthe vehicle at any time, while restricting the drivers device for allother purposes, and restricting passenger devices if the noise level inthe vehicle exceeds some threshold (representing too much distraction tothe driver) or if the driver is determined to be distracted (throughmeasurements of the drivers facial expression, reaction time, etc.). Ingeneral, the scope of the secure system may include, but is not limitedto, purposes of security, regulatory compliance, system user andbystander safety. Devices employing the secure system methodology may beutilized in the government, military, commercial, civilian, private,public, or any other business or society sector. Devices employing thesecure system methodology may include but are not limited to devicesconsidered commercial, consumer, government, military, one-offs,prototypes, COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf), and GOTS (Government OffThe Shelf).

Note that the requirement for a configuration server is implementationdepended. Other implementations may include a device which includes thesecurity software, but in which the enterprise administration the deviceis omitted, such that the device and its TTS configuration are definedupon system installation, and all measurements of TTS and policyenforcement occurs solely on the device in absence of any externalcontrol and configuration servers. In such a case, the security state ofSystem Installed on Device [FIG. 5-1], Keystore Loaded onto Device [FIG.5-2], Keystore unlocked [FIG. 5-3], Configuration Loaded [FIG. 5-4], AllConfigurations and Files Unloaded [FIG. 5-6], Keystore Loaded [FIG.5-7], Keystore removed from device [FIG. 5-8], and System uninstalledfrom device [FIG. 5-9] may be omitted from the implementation, andConfiguration Loaded [FIG. 5-4] is replaced by a permanent configurationwhich remains on the device so long as the secure system is installed.

The device may contain one or more communication methods, including butnot limited to cellular voice, VOIP (voice over IP), voice and/or videoover any data carrying method, text communication (SMS or by any othermethod), email, any combination thereof, or another other transmissionor receipt of data from this device to any other device or system in anmanner which could be considered communication. For each communicationmethod on the device, the security state of that method may take on anumber of different states independent of any other the security statesof any other communication method on the device. Once in the operationstate ([FIG. 8-1]), each communication method (CM) can independentsecurity states including, beginning with having a configuration(including TTS rules) loaded ([FIG. 8-C1]). Once configured, thecommunication method may go into a keystore access disabled state ([FIG.8-C7]) whereby the necessary credentials required to establish andsecure the communication are unavailable to the CM, thus preventingunauthorized use or attack revealing the nature of the CM. The keystoreaccess may be enabled, allowing access to CM related data andconfiguration, and to allow for the encryption of communication ([FIG.8-C2]). Incoming and/or outgoing communication may be enabled (togetheror individually) ([FIG. 8-C3]). Communication may then be establishedbetween the device and another user/device/etc. ([FIG. 8-C4]). An activeand ongoing communication connection may be forcefully terminated ([FIG.8-C5]). Incoming and outgoing communication capability may be prohibited(together or individually) ([FIG. 8-C6]), from which point thecommunication method may be further restricted through the preventing ofthe keystore access and the unloading the communication configuration.

A particular example of the implementation of the system is shown infigure FIG. 9. One or more server computers (Server [FIG. 9-1]) act asthe system and application configuration servers. These machines receiveperiodic TTS measurements from both a mobile device (Mobile Device [FIG.9-2]), and a desktop device (Desktop Computer [FIG. 9-3]), both runningthis secure system. Furthermore, the server(s) are configured tointerpret and process these TTS measurements through one or morealgorithms in a manner which may be used to create a global TTS pictureof the entire enterprise system including all devices with the securesystem. For instance, an algorithm looking for measurements indicatingif a system was currently in use by a user, and if so where the devicewas currently physically located (possibly from a GPS locationmeasurement), and who was currently using the system (as per theauthenticated user credentials, device assignment to a user, and perhapsthrough real time user identification through biometric/video/audiomeans). A security alert could be generated by the server in cases wherethe measurements indicate that a state exists in the global system whichfails a security test. For instance, a user working on a fixed locationdesktop computer could not also simultaneously be working on a mobiledevice located a substantial distance from the desktop machine. In sucha case, it is clear that at least one and perhaps both of the systemsmay be subject to a security violation including use by unauthorizedpersons. In such a case, and as determined by the specificimplementation, the server generated alert could cause automatic actionson the offending devices (forced user logoff, device wipe, etc.), andcould send notification to enterprise security systems and personal toact upon the alert.

The process of performing the out of band certificate loading may beachieved through the inserting of a memory or data storage devicecontaining digital certificate information, including but limited to, aSIM card, SD card, or magnetic disk, into the protected device wherebythe protected device loads the necessary files from the inserted devicefor use within the system.

The process of performing the out of band certificate loading mayfurther be achieved through the following unique and novel method whichis a subject of this invention and is presented in figure FIG. 10.

An authorized user of the system may authenticate with a source computer[FIG. 10-1] or other electronic system running a particular programestablished for this process using any common available method,including but not limited to entering a password, providing a SIM card,or entering other credentials. Once authenticated [FIG. 10-4], the usermay direct the software to either obtain existing digital certificateinformation or to create new digital certificate informationcorresponding to the user and device that is to be provisioned, eithercase requiring a data connection [FIG. 10-6] to the certificate serverfrom the source computer [FIG. 10-3]. The digital certificateinformation may be stored in a PKCS12 store, or in any other form. Thesystem will create a bundle of data [FIG. 10-9] comprising of the datain the certificate store [FIG. 10-8] and optionally other data [FIG.10-7], including but not limited to, system settings, location of thesystem configuration or application servers, user configurationinformation, application information, or any other data. The resultingbundle of data is prepared for encoding into a multidimensionalpictorial or other physical representation. This could includeoptionally encrypting the bundle of data [FIG. 10-10] using userprovided credentials, encoding the bundle of data into a differentformat (i.e. Base 64), and encoding the resulting data into themultidimensional pictorial or other physical representation [FIG. 10-11](i.e. a two dimensional bar code, such as a QR code, a three dimensionalhologram, or a complex higher dimensional representation). The softwarewould then, either automatically or at the users direction, display themulti dimension pictorial or other physical representation [FIG. 10-12],through a monitor or other data output hardware. The physicalrepresentation is displayed in a volatile manner (such as on a computerscreen) which does not allow for permanent versions or duplicates of therepresentation to be made (i.e. by printing). The protected device [FIG.10-2] would use an attached digital camera or other physical inputdevice to capture an image or physical representation [FIG. 10-14] ofthe computer monitor or other data output hardware which is projectingor emitting a multi dimensional data representation. This data captureis unidirectional (transferring only from the source server to theprotected device) and is considered out of band, since no physical dataconnection is required [FIG. 10-13]. The image, once captured by theprotected device, is processed by the protected device where the data isextracted. The process by which the data was prepared is reversed, whichincludes decoding the multi-dimensional data representation [FIG.10-15], optionally unencoding the data (i.e. Base64 to byte conversion),optionally decrypting the data representation [FIG. 10-16], extractingthe certificate store [FIG. 10-18] and optional additional data [FIG.10-19] from the data bundle [FIG. 10-17]. The resulting certificatestore and optional additional data are then made available for usewithin the protected system [FIG. 10-21]. This out of band credentialtransfer process provides a means of transferring data from one computersystem to another in a unidirectional manner. By requiring the user toauthenticate with the source computer, multi-factor authentication isachieved (both the authentication of the user to the source computer andthe provisioning of the device with the credential information whichrequires the physical presence of the protected device and user). Toensure that the physical representation is captured by only one deviceand is not retained (i.e. by taking a photograph or copying therepresentation) for use in provisioning additional devices, the databundle may include an expiration date, whereby a protected devicerunning the software would be prevented from processing data from anexpired data bundle. Additionally, a requirement might be made that theprotected device must register with the configuration server or otherserver within a short time window after loading the data to confirmreceipt of the data [FIG. 10-20]. The failure to register within thetime window, or the registration of multiple devices with the samecredentials could be used as a trigger to invalided that particular userdevice certificate and related credential information.

A particular implementation of the system may use a mobile device as asecure token in a two factor authentication scheme. For instance, abriefcase may contain a lock implementing the secure system which isunlocked via traditional means (e.g., a key or a passcode) so long as asecond authentication token is also present. That second authenticationtoken may be in the form of a mobile device which includes the securesoftware and TTS rules. That authentication token is only consideredpresent when the device is within some close proximity to the briefcaseand certain TTS rules are satisfied. The authentication tokencommunicates with the briefcase via BlueTooth, NFC, WiFi, direct wire orsome other method by which TTS rules on the briefcase interpret themeasurements and authentication data from the authentication tokendevice to determine if the unlocking of the lock on the briefcase shouldbe allowed.

A TTS rule may be implemented in a manner which employs machine learningand which allows the definition of the rule to evolve overtime with orwithout external intervention. For instance, machine learningtechniques, such as but not limited to an artificial neural network, maybe used to recognize after some period of training time what isconsidered a normal use of a secure system. Any further use of thesystem would involve the comparison of the sensor measurements to thelearned normal usage pattern. That further use which is considerednormal usage within some statistical certainty would pass the TTS rule.That further use which does not pass the TTS rule is identified as a usewhich does not represent normal usage and may be used as a basis to denyor limit a secure system function, or as a step which would prompt someinternal or external action requiring the presentation of furtherauthentication or verification, through which the machine learningtechnique of the TTS rule could be further trained to recognized thenewly authorized usage pattern as a type of usual system usage in thefuture.

A particular implementation of the system may use a secure system devicewhich has a door lock peripheral and unlock mechanism Like a typicaldoor lock, a user would unlock the door in part with the presentation ofa key, code, badge, biometric, or some other authorizing information.The secure system then allows a further access control in the form ofone or more TTS rules which must be satisfied after the presentation ofa correct key in order for the door to unlock. The secure system devicemay have TTS rules defined which take simple measurements representingthe conditions within the vicinity of the door to determine if the doorshould be unlocked, including, but not limited to, the time of day, thelighting conditions, the number of people present, the spacing betweenpeople, the rate of movement of people, object recognition includingidentifying what objects are present alone or in the possession of aperson, identification of the recognition of the inability to identifypersons or object, sounds present (such as if an alarm nearby issounding), or vibrations (such as if there is an earthquake). The securesystem device may have TTS rules defined which implement machinelearning techniques to determine typical usage over time. For instance,a rule may allow key entry to any person who has previously entered thedoor a number of times at similar times of day and carrying similarobjects. If that same person were to attempt entry at an atypical timeof day or carrying objects different than normal behavior, that rule maynot be passed. The failure of a TTS rule which involves machine learningtechniques may allow for a user directed training feedback mechanism,whereby the person may need to enter additional authenticationinformation to verify that the attempted use of the system is an allowedusage. After successful entry of the verification information, themachine learning techniques employed by the TTS rule would be furthertrained to recognize such future entry attempts as authorized. Thefailure of a TTS rule which involves machine learning techniques mayallow for a system directed training feedback mechanism, whereby thefailure of the TTS rule may send a message to a security station, wheresecurity personnel or security system may independently verify theattempted access. A successful confirmation of the attempted access bythe security personnel or security system would be used to train themachine learning technique employed by the TTS rule to recognize suchfuture entry attempts as authorized.

A particular example of an implementation of the secure system ispresented in FIG. 11. Here, the purpose of the system is to provide aMobile Secure Compartmented Intelligence Facility (M-SCIF). The systemprovides voice and/or video secure conferencing capability between usersin one or more locations and secures each local location through the useof one or more encapsulating electrically conductive tents (to preventelectromagnetic signal penetration or emission), active electromagneticdetection hardware (to identify unauthorized electronic devices withinthe M-SCIF), and/or counter measures (hardware and/or software based).

The M-SCIF is implemented using a central configuration server [FIG.11-1] which manages a list of authorized system locations and users,along with security credentials. The Secure Session Initiation Protocolserver (SSIP), or a similar protocol, which may be on the same ordifferent physical hardware, provides a directory lookup server so thatvoice/video calls initiated from one physical location may be directedto the appropriate destination. This system is not limited to usingSSIP, and any other point to point, multipoint, or central servercommunication initiation protocol may be used.

Each physical location where an M-SCIF is deployed [FIG. 11-2] containsa local router [FIG. 11-3] and one or more handheld devices [FIG. 11-4].The local router is configured through a secure connection to theconfiguration server and initiates voice/video calls through the SSIPserver [FIG. 11-7]. The handheld devices provide control of the localrouter. One or more handheld devices located within a given physicallocation allow for communication between users in the same location. Thevoice/video signals from devices in one location may also be routed tohandsets in other physical locations [FIG. 11-6]. The router containssensor hardware [FIG. 11-5] consisting of optionally an electromagneticspectrum sensor and other sensors. When an electromagnetic spectrumsensor is deployed, measurements can be made regarding the activepresence of electronic devices. When electronic devices are detectedwhich are not authorized, the detection of such devices provides a TTSinput into the secure system methodology which is then used to performsystem actions such as terminating or prohibiting calls between users.

A detailed description of the functional diagram of the router box isgiven in FIG. 12. The router box [FIG. 12-1] contains a centralprocessing unit (CPU) [FIG. 12-2]. The CPU interfaces with a Near FieldCommunications (NFC) peripheral acting in either peer to peer or tagemulation mode [FIG. 12-3]. This NFC interface allows for the handhelddevices which provide user endpoints to be associated with the routerbox for both authentication and configuration purposes. All dataconnections between the handheld devices to the router box, router boxto router box, and router box to handheld device are encrypted. Theencryption keys used may differ for each leg of the data transport, andthe unencrypted combined signals captured within a location may beavailable on the router box platform for use within that physicaldevice. Other methods of authentication and configuration of the devicescan also be used which rely on data connections including but notlimited to WiFi, Bluetooth, infrared (IR), direct wire, QR (or othersingle or multi dimensional visual data representation) Image Capture.The router box may optionally be attached to cellular [FIG. 12-4], WiFi[FIG. 12-13], or ethernet network access [FIG. 12-14]. The router boximplements the secure platform methodology and includes sensor inputsincluding electromagnetic spectrum device identification [FIG. 12-5] andother sensors [FIG. 12-7], which may include but are not limited toaudio, motion, proximity, vibration, and movement sensors. Hardwareactions that can be implemented based on security settings includecountermeasures such as a electromagnetic frequency jammer [FIG. 12-6]which can precisely target unauthorized devices identified by theelectromagnetic spectrum device identification system in order todisable or block operations of the unauthorized devices, including thedisabling of the device or the blocking of transmissions or data captureby those unauthorized devices.

The router box may optionally also provide a local ambient audio noisegeneration system as a countermeasure against physical recording deviceswhich are not detectable by the electromagnetic spectrum deviceidentification system. The audio generated by user action (usersspeaking in a voice or video conversation) in the room is routed throughthe router box and is decrypted there providing a combined (mixed) audiosignal representative of the sounds generated within the room. Thataudio signal [FIG. 12-8] is fed from the router box CPU to digitalsignal processor(s) [FIG. 12-9] where random white or pink noise isgenerated and modified through the inclusion of the actual recordedsound signal such that it is not possible to extract the original soundsignal from the generated white noise. The resulting modified whitenoise is passed through an amplifier [FIG. 12-10] and to audio ports[FIG. 12-11] providing external connections to one or more modulescontaining a speaker and/or a microphone [FIG. 12-12] located throughoutthe M-SCIF physical area. The inclusion of microphones throughout thearea provides additional feedback into the DSP(s) allowing for finetuning of the modified white noise generation to ensure that no usergenerated audio content is recoverable. The white noise that isgenerated, amplified, and broadcast on the speakers is of substantialpower such that two users talking to each other in the same room cannotactually hear each other without the use of the handsets. To facilitateuse of the handsets, the handsets may be attached to secure encryptedbluetooth or wired headsets (speaker and microphone) which support builtin noise cancelation capabilities.

As disclosed herein, in accordance with particular embodiments, a devicemay include a sensor such as: an accelerometer; a gyroscope; an ambientlight sensor; a device screen backlight level sensor; an audio sensor(including microphone); a GPS or other location or positioning providingsensor; a camera; a WiFi antenna or connection; a cellular antenna orconnection; a packet radio; a data radio; a voice radio; a Bluetoothantenna or connection; a thermometer or other temperature sensor; abarometer or other pressure sensor; a biometric input device; a NearField Communication (NFC) antenna or connection; a camera; a proximitysensor; a radiation, chemical, or biological detector; a biomechanicssensor; a biomedical sensor; an electric or magnetic field sensor; anelectromagnetic spectrum analyzer; an electromagnetic signal detector;an infrared sensor; an infrared camera; a sonar imaging device; a sonarrange finder; a laser range finder; a data connection; and/or one ormore software sensors including values provided by the device hardware,operating system, and other software modules or programs regarding thecurrent operational state and configuration of the device.

As used herein, the term “data connection” may comprise a wired orwireless connection through which data is transmitted and/or received.For example, a data connection may comprise a wired connection using anEthernet cable, a coaxial cable, a connection using power lines (such asa broadband over power line (“BPL”) connection), USB, Firewire (IEEE1394), GPIB (IEEE 488), parallel port (IEEE 1284), RS-232, I2C, SPI orany other wired data connection. A data connection may further comprisea wireless connection using an antenna such as Cellular, Radio Frequency(RF), WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC, a satellite connection, a Zigbee connection,or any other wireless data connection.

As used herein, the term “communication data” may comprise any data thattransmitted or received with the goal of enabling communication. Forexample, communication data may comprise voice, video, text or otherdata that is exchanged between devices, including data transmitted usinga cellular connection or data transmitted using a communication protocolsuch as Voice over IP (“VOIP”). The transmission of communication datamay be in real time (such as a voice conversion) or via a store andretrieve or a store and forward method (such as email).

As used herein, the term “sensor data” refers to data collected from anytype of sensor. A “measurement” may comprise any one or more valuescollected from any type of sensor. A measurement may further compriseone or more other measurements for which the values of said othermeasurements have been combined, filtered, algorithmically processed,altered, adjusted, or otherwise modified to produce the resulting valueof the said measurement.

The following illustrations is provided by way of example and notlimitation. Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention maycomprise the following numbered examples.

1. The methodology described may be implemented in an electronic systemor device as either software, hardware, firmware, or a combination ofthe above.

2. The electronic system or device that the system of example 1 may beimplemented on includes, but is not limited to, a server computer,desktop computer, embedded computer, mobile device, mobile phone, mobiletablet computer, or other mobile or non-mobile computer system. Theelectronic system or device may or may not have a screen, userinterface, keyboard, mouse, microphone, speaker, or other various formsof user input or output.

3. A secure computing system, comprising: one or more devices to besecured (protected device), configuration server, application server,data server, sensor hardware and/or software, Tailored Trustworthy Space(TTS) definitions, and the identification of the various TTS scenariosbased on sensor measurements, and configurable hardware or softwareactions, including application and data access and feature controls, tobe performed for various TTS scenarios.

4. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 implementsthe secure system methodology as a system preinstalled on a device bydevice manufacturer, installed by a reseller, or installed by a deviceowner or third party. It may be part of the device hardware, part of thedevice operating system, run as an application running on top of adevice operating system, or as any combination thereof. When run as anapplication, the secure system may be unloaded from the device, and indoing so, preventing evidence of the prior existence of the securesystem on the device once unloaded.

5. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 may beimplemented in a special case where the device is an embedded systempreloaded with the necessary configure, application, and data, as toallow the device to operate with the secure system methodology as asingle and isolated device in absence of any other system components. Insuch a case, the TTS measurements and rules act only within the embeddedsystem and are not shared external to that system and provide for adynamically changing security state within the embedded system as astand alone solution.

6. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 furthercomprising a combination of hardware, firmware, and/or software whichprovides the ability to process sensor and other data input, calculatemeasurements based upon that input representative of the operatingposture of the device and other conclusions, apply those measurements toa set of rules providing varying levels of security and other access toapplication functions, data, device features, and communication methods,and other information, procedures, functions, and hardware, and providea means for running of applications in a secure manner in which thesecurity access rules are strictly enforced. The rules define thevarious Tailored Trustworthy Spaces based on TTS measurementdefinitions, along with the actions to take when in a particular TTSscenario.

7. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 furthercomprising a TTS manager component, through which all sensormeasurements and TTS measurements are performed, such that measurementdefinitions which share data sources and data processing may reuse andshare the same data resources to minimize power and CPU consumption onthe protected device.

8. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 to besecured by TTS rules may take on states regarding the operational levelof the overall secure system and depending on the result of theapplication of the TTS rules, including but not limited to theinstallation or uninstallation of the secure system from the device, theloading or unloading of the keystore holding device and useridentification credentials on the device, the unlocking or locking ofthe keystore, the loading or unloading of system configuration, and thestate in which the device is said to be in a normal operational state.

9. The device keystore of example 3 is designed to hold, among otherthings, a certificate or other identification of the device and/ordevice user. This certificate or other information is loaded into thekeystore through out of band certification loading via a SIM card, SD,Disk, NFC token, or other method. This certificate may also be loadedthrough a QR capture or the capture of any physical representation ofthe certificate information, as displayed by a separate system for thispurpose.

10. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 furthercomprising of zero or more application containers managed by a singleapplication configuration manager, each of which includes applicationcode, configuration, TTS definitions and rules, data, and othercomponents, stored in such a way as to provide compartmentalization andisolation from other application containers and other parts of thedevice and system.

11. The application manager of example 18 to be secured by TTS rules maytake on states regarding the operational level of the applicationmanager and depending on the result of the application of the TTS rules,including but not limited to, the application configuration being loadedor unloaded.

12. The particular application container of example 19 of an individualapplication to be secured by TTS rules may take on states regarding theoperational level of the particular application container and dependingon the result of the application of the TTS rules, including but notlimited to, application files loaded or unloaded, application listing inthe list of available applications allowed or disallowed, applicationlaunch enabled or disabled, application is in normal execution mode, orapplication is force terminated/halted.

13. The application container of example 18 further comprising of one ormore data containers, each of which holds data with a particular set ofTTS definitions and rules applying to this particular type of data.

14. The data container of example 16 further which may store the data onthe device either unencrypted or encrypted.

15. The data container of example 16, which when storing data encrypted,may enable or disable access to the encryption key by TTS rules.

16. The data container of example 16, which when storing data encrypted,may keep a copy of the encryption key on the application server oranother server, and which may remove the encryption key from the devicewithout removing the data as a means of securely storing the data atrest. As the encryption key does not exist on the device, the encrypteddata is not usable by any attacker, yet the process of retrieving thedata by the authorized user simply requires the reloading of the keyfrom the remote server, thus minimizing the data transfer to the size ofthe key and not requiring the reloading of the entire set of data to thedevice.

17. The data container of example 16 to be secured by TTS rules may takeon states regarding the operational level of the data container anddepending on the result of the application of the TTS rules, includingbut not limited to, data encryption key removed or loaded, data storedor not stored locally on the device, and unencrypted data available tothe application and user.

18. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 furthercomprising of zero or more device features to be secured by TTS rules,where a feature is generally a hardware or software component of thedevice and may include the user of a camera or microphone, the abilityto unlock, tum on, or tum off the device, the ability to enable ordisable network access, WiFi, BlueTooth, NFC, or other technologies, theability to transfer data, the ability to install or remove applications,etc. The device feature may also cause hardware actions when the TTSrule is satisfied, such as a screen notification or the illumination ofan indicator light, the sounding of an alarm or other audible signal, adevice lock or wipe, etc. The TTS rules may be particular to a singledevice feature or general to a set of features.

19. Each of the individual device features of example 18 to be securedby TTS rules may take on states regarding the operational level of thefeature and depending on the result of the application of the TTS rules,including but not limited to, the total disabling, a partial enabling,or a complete enabling of the device feature.

20. The device to be secured (protected device) of example 3 furthercomprising of zero or more communication methods to be secured by TTSrules, where a communication method may include hardware and/or softwaresuch as a cellular phone, network based Voice Over IP (VOIP), videoconferencing, SMS, text messaging, chat, etc. The TTS rules may beparticular to a single communication method or general to a set ofcommunication methods.

21. Each of the individual communication method of example 20 to besecured by TTS rules may take on states regarding the operational levelof the communication method and depending on the result of theapplication of the TTS rules, including but not limited to, the loadingand unloading of the communication method configuration, the disablingand enabling of the keystore access used to hold credentials andencryption keys used to secure the communication method, the enablingand disabling of outgoing and/or incoming calls, the allowing of acommunication to proceed and continue, and the forcing of an ongoingcommunication to terminate.

22. The configuration server of example 3 further comprising a serversoftware and user interface whereby the management of users, applicationservers, security definitions, sensor measurement definitions, and otherconfiguration information are stored, managed, changed, saved, andprovided to the devices to be configured. The various functions of theconfiguration server may also be divided among various configurationservers to provide compartmentalization or for other purposes.

23. The protected device of example 6 wherein the device is configuredto access the configuration server of example 22 in a manner which loadsthe correct configuration data on the device, as pertaining to theidentity of the device, device owner, and device user, for use by allrelated systems on the device which perform functions relating to thesecuring of the device as per the methodology of example 1.

24. The application server of example 3 further comprising a serversoftware and user interface whereby the management of users, securitydefinitions, sensor measurement definitions, other configurationinformation, application files including application code and datapertaining to a particular application are stored, managed, changed,saved, and provided to the devices to be configured. The variousfunctions of the application server may also be divided among variousapplication servers to provide compartmentalization or for otherpurposes. An application server may contain information describing oneor more applications, and multiple application servers may be utilized.

25. The data server of example 3 further comprising a server softwareand user interface whereby the management of users, securitydefinitions, sensor measurement definitions, other configurationinformation, pertaining to a particular class of data are stored,managed, changed, saved, and provided to the devices to be configured.The various functions of the data server may also be divided amongvarious data servers to provide compartmentalization or data siloing orfor other purposes. A data server may contain information accessible toone or more applications which are run on the protected device. A dataserver providing data for a particular application may also beincorporated into the functioning of the application server itself, andneed not be a separate object.

26. The protected device of example 6 may save data to and retrieve datafrom the application and/or data server of example 3. The data may bespecific to the user and device, specific to the user, specific to thedevice, or general and shared among all users of the application and/orsystem. The transfer of the data between the protected device andapplication server may be made over an unencrypted or encryptedconnection. The data furthermore may be unencrypted or encrypted using akey known only to the protected device or known both to the protecteddevice and the application server and/or system.

27. The sensors comprised of hardware and/or software of example 3wherein local or remote measurements of a device's operating conditionsare recorded and made available for on device or off device processing,which may be performed in real time or as a batch process, and which maybe embedded within the device, attached to the device as peripherals, oroperated external to the device.

28. The sensors of example 27 further which as determined by the deviceuse case and desired measurements may include and are not limited to:accelerometer; gyroscope; ambient light sensor; device screen backlightlevel sensor; audio sensor (including microphone); GPS or other locationor positioning providing sensor; camera; WiFi; cellular; packet radio;data radio; voice radio; bluetooth; thermometer; barometer; biometricinput; Near Field Communication (NFC); camera; proximity sensor;radiation, chemical, or biological detector; biomechanics sensor;biomedical sensor; electric or magnetic field sensor; electromagneticspectrum analyzer; electromagnetic signal detector; infrared sensor;infrared camera; sonar imaging; sonar range finder; laser range finder;software sensors including values provided by the device hardware,operating system, and other sensors regarding the current operationalstate and configuration of the device.

29. The data obtained from the sensors of example 28 may be made intoTTS measurements through processing. The various measurements andcorresponding data capture, analysis, and processing may be performed insoftware, hardware (including specialized hardware such as digitalsignal processing circuits or general hardware such as a standard CPU),or a combination of both.

30. Any combination of data obtained from one or more sources may beused to make TTS measurements, with the sources being comprised of: thesensors of example 28, data from external sources including a data fileon the device or a data source on a networked or connected device,and/or live data from other devices made available through physicalconnection or network connection.

31. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited toaudio, wherein the following detailed measurements regarding ambientaudio can be made including but not limited to ambient audio detectionof power level, peak frequency, a sounding alarm, a human voiceconversation, a known identifiable human voice, crowd noise, silence,white noise, colored noise.

32. The measurements of example 31 may in part be interpreted asrepresenting a number of people within range of the protected device,and the existence or absence of the authorized user or users of thedevice being within some range of the device.

33. The measurements of example 31 may in part be interpreted asrepresenting the amount of noise present in the vicinity of a devicewhich may be used as a measurement as to the likelihood that a bystandercan hear noise generated either by the device or the device user.

34. The results of the measurements of example 32 and/or example 33 maybe used to make a TTS measurement representing the likelihood that aspoken communication (such as a phone call) may be overheard by abystander. This measurement may be used by a TTS rule which restrictsthe ability to make and continue a communication to only occur when thelikelihood of a bystander overhearing the communication is below somepredetermined acceptable threshold. This TTS rule may be furtherexpanded, so that restrictions based on the amount of ambient noise areonly applied when other humans are detected within some distance of thedevice, with that detection being made through any TTS measurementavailable providing such information.

35. The measurements of example 31 may be made through a process thatmay include, but is not limited to, the application of a FourierTransform to provide frequency spectrum information, the application oftriangle filters, peak filters, peak identification, harmonic filters,harmonics identification, fundamental frequency identification, andother filters to the frequency spectrum, algorithms to identify theexistence of a human voice, the identity of a voice, and/or voice printrecognition, and algorithms to identify noise generated by variousanimate and inanimate objects including living animals, sounds of nature(such as blowing wind or rain), and operational sounds (such as fansrunning), and human interface sounds (such as keys being pressed, orbeeping or alarms) generated by various types of equipment.

36. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited toaccelerometer, gyroscope, and audio, wherein the following detailedmeasurements regarding user movement can be made including but notlimited to determining probabilities that the user is standing still,walking, running in a straight line, running in an evasive manner,falling, walking or running up or down stairs, sitting, traveling in avehicle.

37. The measurements of example 36 regarding the motion of the user anddevice may be made, but is not limited to this particular process of,processing of accelerometer data through a sliding window DiscreteFourier Transform (DFT) using both device and global coordinate systemsalong the x, y, z axis, in the xy, yz, xz planes, as a magnitude in alldimensions xyz, and as a rotation along the x, y, z axis, to providemovement frequency spectrum information

38. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited toaccelerometer, gyroscope, and audio, wherein the following detailedmeasurements regarding device movement can be made including but notlimited to determining probabilities that the device is left on still ona surface (such as a table), being held by a human, being carried in amanner in which the device is not in use (such as in a pocket or at aperson's side), being carried in a manner in which the device is in use(such as in front of a person), being tossed, shaken, thrown, ordropped.

39. The measurements of example 38, may be made, but are not limited to,making measurements along the global z, xy plane, and xy rotation, withvariables being generated from the frequency and power informationcontained in these spectrums. A log-likelihood function, neural network,or other event identification method may be used, to make probabilityestimates that the device is still on a table, or that the device isbeing carried by a user who is either standing, walking while reading,walking with the device at his side, running in a straight line, runningin a zig-zag (or evasive) pattern, or normally or quickly walking up anddown a flight of stairs, and other types of motion identification.

40. A measurement of the sensors of example 38, in the device coordinatesystem, where measurements are made to indicate user initiated actions,such as device shake, rotate, and flip, and which are used to create TTSmeasurements and TTS rules used to perform actions based on userinitiated actions. For instance, the user may shake the device to unloaddata keys for a particular application.

41. A measurement of the sensors of example 38, in the global coordinatesystem, where measurements are made to indicate unintentional actions,such as the dropping of a device from a height or the tossing of adevice some distance. A TTS measurement may be made for such situationswith a TTS rule that may choose to perform some action in anticipationof the device being lost by the user. For instance, if dropped fromheight exceeding 50 ft., a device wipe may be initialized prior toimpact under the assumption that data on the soon to be heavily damageddevice would only be recovered by an unauthorized user of the device (asthe authorized user would just get a new device and reload the data fromthe servers once authenticated).

42. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited tothose pertaining to biometric input, camera, and audio, whereinmeasurements regarding user identification may be made through face,voice, biometric, or other methods of user recognition andidentification.

43. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited tothose pertaining to biometric input, camera, and audio, whereinmeasurements regarding the number of (or absence of) people or deviceusers who may or may not be within the proximity of the device orinteracting with the device may be made.

44. A particular measurement of example 43 in which the number of facesvisible to the camera located on the screen side of the device may beused as a TTS measurement as to the number of people viewing the screen.Such a measurement may be used by a TTS rule to limit the display ofcertain data when the number of faces viewing the screen reaches aparticular threshold. For instance, sensitive data might only be shownwhen exactly 1 face is in view of the screen, and 0 faces makes thedisplay of data unnecessary, and 2 or more faces would indicate thatsomeone other than the potential authorized user is also viewing thedata.

45. A particular measurement of example 43 in which the identificationof the people whose faces are visible to the camera located on thescreen side of the device would provide a TTS measurement through whicha TTS rule could take action depending on if all, some, or none of thepeople viewing the screen were authorized to do so.

46. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited tothose pertaining to visual (camera), audio (microphone, vibration, andaccelerometer), taste, smell, and touch, wherein measurements regardingthe location of the device may be made through individual objectrecognition whereby recognition of a physical location may be madethrough the identification of the various objects within a location.

47. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited tothose pertaining to visual (camera), audio (microphone, vibration, andaccelerometer), taste, smell, and touch, wherein measurements regardingthe location of the device may be made through general locationrecognition whereby recognition of a physical location may be madethrough the general properties of the location.

48. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited toambient light sensor and backlight level wherein a measurement regardingthe likelihood that an unauthorized party might be able to view thecontent on the device screen from a distance beyond the distance betweenthe authorized user and the device screen (e.g.: an eavesdropper lookingover one's shoulder).

49. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited to GPS,network, WiFi, cellular, and/or external data sources through which aTTS Measurement can be made regarding the location of the device and thetrustworthiness of that measurement, where the trustworthinessrepresents that multiple available location measurements are inagreement, within accuracy limitations. For instance, the agreement of aGPS signal, WiFi based location, and a lookup of the recorded locationof the currently in use cellular tower would indicate good agreement anda trustworthy location measurement, whereas a discrepancy in any ofthose location measurements would indicate the potential compromise orspoofing of one or more location providers.

50. The measurement of the location of the device of example 49 may beused to detect cases of impossible travel of a device. For instance if adevice suddenly changes apparent location by a great distance over ashort period of time, such a measurement could indicate unauthorizedtravel methods (such as air travel) or the spoofing or tampering of somelocation data provider on the device.

51. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited to GPS,network, WiFi, cellular, and/or external data sources through which aTTS Measurement can be made regarding the current location of the deviceas compared to the recorded location of the currently connected cellulartower. Such a measurement provides a security assessment of the cellulartower and can indicate connection to an unauthorized or spoofed cellulartower.

52. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited to,microphone, thermometer, barometer, pressure, location, and lightsensors may be used to determine if a device is currently locatedoutside or inside a building or structure, along with the approximateelevation of the device. Combined with external data regarding groundlevel elevations, the elevation measurement may be translated to a floornumber of a building if the device is within a building. Combined withexternal current weather information, the correlation between thereported weather and device measurements may be used to determine if thedevice is outside, and may be used to verify the location of the device(such that the weather measured by the device and the external weatherdata source both report the same weather in the same location).

53. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited tomicrophone, camera, and proximity sensors may be used for user directedinput of a TTS measurement. For instance, a user may be required by aTTS rule to cover the proximity sensor of a device to allow access tosome data. Such a requirement might only allow data access while thesensor is covered, allowing the user to covertly restrict access, or torestrict access should the device placement be changed (such as if thedevice is taken by a passerby from the hands of the authorized user).

54. A subset of sensors of example 28, including but not limited tohardware and software measurements of the device itself, such as CPU andmemory consumption, battery level, network activity, the state of thescreen (powered on/off), the charging status of the device, thecurrently running programs on the device, etc., may be used to form TTSmeasurements through which TTS rules are defined to act upon the variousstates of the device. For instance, atypical power usage, CPU usage, andmemory consumption may be indicative of mal-ware on the device.Unexpected network traffic may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration.In either example case, TTS rules may be defined to lock down thesystem, protecting applications and data, when such TTS measurementsindicate such events.

55. The Tailored Trustworthy Space (TTS) measurement definitions ofexample 3 each of which are comprised of the description one or moresensor inputs, parameters regarding the configuration of these sensors,the algorithm specifications for combining the various sensor inputs,and the requirements of the combined sensor algorithm outputs whichsatisfy the requirements of the said TTS. The result of a TTSmeasurement may also be used as another input into another TTSmeasurement, allowing for the chaining of data processing and theformulation of complex TTS measurement definitions.

56. The identification of the various TTS scenarios based on sensormeasurements definitions of example 3 which is comprised of a softwareor hardware subsystem which, using the TTS definitions and sensor data,computes the values necessary for TTS situation determination.

57. The identification of the various TTS scenarios of example 56 ismade through the application of TTS rules which define one or more TTSmeasurements, how the resulting values of those measurements should becombined (for instance, the different values may be average or a maximumor minimum among the values may be taken as the resulting value), howthat resulting value should be interpreted (for instance the value mustbe above or below a threshold or within some range for the rule toapply), and what actions to take when the rule is in effect. The TTSrule may apply on a system wide level, may be very granular and apply toonly a particular type of data for a single application, or may apply onany level in between the most general and most granular case.

58. The on device processing of data as performed by the subsystem ofexample 56 may be configured to operate in such a way as to ensure thatany processing of sensor data is performed in a pipelined manner whichallows multiple consumers of data to share the results of a singlecomputational step which is performed at a rate sufficient to satisfythe date rate requirements of all corresponding consumers. Thispipelined and sharing of data processing results is a means of reducingthe computational and power consumption on the device which performs theTTS sensor measurement and data processing.

59. The TTS algorithms of example 56 wherein one or more sensormeasurements are combined to create an overall measurement which is usedfor TTS scenario identification. The algorithms may include but are notlimited to methods such as simple mathematical functions, stepfunctions, likelihood functions, artificial neural networks, nearestneighbor, and other statistical or mathematical methods for the purposeof event, scenario, action, or other identification.

60. The application and data access and feature controls, to beperformed for various TTS scenarios of example 3 which is comprised of asoftware or hardware subsystem which using identified current TTSsituations of example 56 and the TTS definitions of example 55 performsthe necessary adjustments to the system to allow or restrict access tovarious applications, application features, data, and other systemcomponents independent of each other.

61. The Tailored Trustworthy Space (TTS) measurements of example 3 maybe transmitted on one device and onto another within the secure system.This allows, for example, the TTS Level of an entire communicationnetwork consisting of endpoints and internal network components to shareTTS measurement values, allowing each part of the system to make its ownassessment of the security state of the combined system, and allowingeach part of the system to act on its own rules. For example, twodevices between which there is a phone call may have data routed througha network switch which also makes TTS measurements within the securesystem. The opening of the rack door on the network switch rack maytrigger a TTS measurement which is used by a TTS rule on one of the endpoint devices to termination the phone call. Another example would bethe detection of the same user using a mobile device and a desktopcomputer in two locations at the same time. Through the combination ofthe TTS measurements, certain TTS rules may be applied which detect thisimpossible scenario and lock out access to one or both machines whilealso notifying a security team.

62. The communication between two or more devices of example 61 may alsobe used in an Enterprise scenario where one or more servers monitor theTTS state of one or more protected devices, thereby generating alertsand notifications to other enterprise systems when the security statesof any single or combination of the devices meet some criteria.

63. The communication between two or more devices of example 61 using avariant of SRTP protocol or any other protocol for communications mayinclude TTS measurement and configuration data as an additional datachannel or through an addition or modification to that protocol, as ameans of providing real time sharing of TTS measurement values acrossdevices.

64. A digital certificate provisioning system, comprising: a sourcecomputer system, a generated two dimensional QR code, or any othersingle or multi dimensioned physical representation of data, containingdigital certificate data and/or other information, and a receivingsystem.

65. The source computer system of example 64 further comprising a screenon which to display the generated two dimensional barcode, or any othersingle or multi dimensioned physical representation of data, thenecessary interface to a digital credential management system, and userinterfaces required for authenticating and controlling the sourcecomputer.

66. The digital credential management system of example 65 whereininformation regarding authorized users of the system are contained,including account information regarding particular users such as but notlimited to permitted access duration and time, security and access rolesand restrictions, authentication credential information (includingpasswords, certificates, or biometric information), informationregarding previously generated user certificates and certificateissuance status, including a list of previously expired or revokedcertificate information.

67. The digital credential management system of example 65 wherein thephysical location of such system may be on the same or differenthardware than the source computer system of example 64, and when on thesame physical hardware, may reside in a different or the same virtualmachine as the source computer, and when in the same virtual machine,may be executed as separate or within the same body of software as thesource computer.

68. The receiving system of example 64 which can take a picture of orotherwise capture and interpret the physical representation created anddisplayed by the source computer system, allowing to the unidirectionaland out of band transfer of digital certificate data and/or otherinformation from the source system to the receiving system.

69. The requirement to authenticate with the source computer system ofexample 64 in order to obtain the code to load on the receiving systemof example 64 provides a means of multi factor authentication when thereis an expiration applied to the generated code requiring the receivingdevice to load and register with the credential management system withina short time period, as both the authentication of the source systemmust be performed in the same location in which the receiving system isphysically located.

70. A Mobile Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (M-SCIF) maybe created comprised of, but not limited to, an EM shielding tent, awhite or pink noise generator, voice scrambling noise generators, secureheadset equipment, router boxes providing connectivity between one ormore secure headsets at one or more locations, video conferencingcapability, EM spectrum analysis for the identification of unauthorizeddevices or listening or data capture devices, and EM jamming equipment.

71. The white or pink noise generator of example 70 may be configured toproduce a noise level suitable to prevent the recording, hearing, orinterpretation of sound by a person or device, particularly of spokenword, within a close distance to the origination of the sound.

72. The voice scrambling noise generators of example 70 may beconfigured to obtain an audio signal (perhaps from a microphone) of athe sound created by a person (perhaps while speaking). That sound isthen processed through hardware and/or software such that a speaker maybe used to output a signal which will cancel the audio spoken by theperson, so that a recording device or another person in close proximityto the person creating the source sound would be unable to discern anymeaningful information from that person.

73. Any combination of the white or pink noise generator of example 71and the voice scrambling noise generators of example 72 may be usedtogether or separately in the M-SCIF.

74. The secure headsets of example 70 are used to capture spoken soundfrom users of the system, to relay that information securely through arouter and then back to the other headsets so that the sound of a speakmay be heard by other participants in the communication. A router maynot be required in some configurations where the headsets can connectdirectly to each other.

75. The router of example 70 allows for the connection of multiplephysical locations into the same communication.

76. The protocol used to transmit data between headsets may include theTTS measurements from each device within the system, such that allendpoints of the communication may allow continued communication basedon TTS rules specific to each device.

I claim:
 1. A method performed by a first and second data processingapparatus that are communicatively coupled, the method comprising:obtaining, by the first data processing apparatus, one or more signalsfrom one or more sensors communicatively coupled to the first dataprocessing apparatus; determining, by the first data processingapparatus, a varying trust level in the operating security state of thefirst data processing apparatus by applying at least one of a scalingfunction, identity function, assignment function, step function,artificial neural network, and machine learning techniques to the one ormore signals from the one or more sensors to determine a first TTSmeasurement; determining, by the first data processing apparatus, atleast two trust levels from the one or more signals, wherein each trustlevel is determined independently of any other trust level; creating athird trust level by combining the at least two trust levels;transmitting, by the first data processing apparatus to the second dataprocessing apparatus, the first TTS measurement, wherein the second dataprocessing apparatus is operating in a first operating security state;and changing, by the second data processing apparatus after receivingthe first TTS measurement, from the first operating security state ofthe second data processing apparatus to a second operating securitystate by at least one of control, direction, manipulation, limitation,activation, and deactivation of at least one of a plurality of operatingsecurity states of the second data processing apparatus; wherein thefirst data processing apparatus and the second data processing apparatusare communicatively coupled by a first communication method; wherein thechanging from the first operating security state to the second operatingsecurity state by the second data processing apparatus comprises:determining, by the second data processing apparatus, a TTS state usingtailored trustworthy space rules (“TTS rules”) and the first TTSmeasurement received from the first data processing apparatus; whereinthe determining, by the first data processing apparatus, one of the atleast two trust levels further comprises: using data from at least oneTTS rule, wherein the data comprises one or more of a historical trustlevel and a historical value for one of the one or more signals used indetermining one of the at least two trust levels; and wherein machinelearning techniques are used to determine if the first data processingapparatus is currently operating in one of a typical way and an atypicalway.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein upon a change of the trust level,causing the second data processing apparatus to terminate acommunication with the first data processing apparatus based on the TTSstate.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the transmitting by the firstdata processing apparatus to the second data processing apparatusfurther comprises transmitting the at least one of: the one or moresignals from the one or more sensors, the TTS state, and the operatingsecurity state of the first data processing apparatus.
 4. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the TTS measurement corresponds to a numeric assessmentof a security posture of a system comprising the first data processingapparatus and the second data processing apparatus, and represents atleast one of the following: that the system is being used compliant witha normal usage pattern; that conditions are both typical and meetcontrol requirements; that an authorized user or users of the first dataprocessing apparatus are within some specified range of the first dataprocessing apparatus; that unauthorized users are not within somespecified range of the first data processing apparatus; and that only aspecified number of persons are viewing a screen of the first dataprocessing apparatus.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the first dataprocessing apparatus is a mobile device comprising at least one of: acell phone, tablet, and watch.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein thefirst data processing apparatus is a non-mobile device comprising atleast one of: a desktop computer, server, and stationary electricalequipment.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the TTS rules specify anaction to at least one of: unlock a keystore on the second dataprocessing apparatus, unlock the second data processing apparatus,unlock a first feature of the second data processing apparatus, andunlock a second feature of an application on the second data processingapparatus.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the first communicationmethod comprises at least one of: a cellular voice call, a VoIP voicecall, voice data, video data, a text, a SMS, an email, and anycombination thereof, whereby data is transferred via the firstcommunication method using one of: a real time method, astore-and-retrieve method, and a store-and-forward method; and whereininformation corresponding to at least one of: the first TTS measurement,the operating security state, the TTS state, the TTS rules, andconfiguration, is stored within at least one of: a body of acommunication message, a header of the communication message, messagingprotocol of the communication message, and a separate messagetransmitted independently of the communication message over a same ordifferent data transport mechanism to one or more communicating dataprocessing apparatuses.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein a first sensorof the one or more sensors is a remote sensor located externally to thefirst data processing apparatus, wherein the remote sensor transmits oneor more of a signal and the first TTS measurement.
 10. The method ofclaim 1, wherein a first sensor of the one or more sensors is located onthe first data processing apparatus and communicatively coupled to aprocessor and a memory inside the first data processing apparatus. 11.The method of claim 1, further comprising: generating, by the first dataprocessing apparatus, a plurality of alerts and notificationstransmitted to at least one of: an externally located system and thesecond data processing apparatus.
 12. A system for facilitatingcommunication between devices comprising: a first data processingapparatus comprising a first processor, a first memory, and one or morefirst sensors; a second data processing apparatus comprising a secondprocessor, a second memory, and communicatively coupled to the firstdata processing apparatus by a first communication method; and anintermediate device comprising one or more second sensors, theintermediate device communicatively coupled between the first dataprocessing apparatus and the second data processing apparatus; whereinthe second memory stores computer-executable instructions that, whenexecuted by the second processor, cause the second data processingapparatus to: receive one or more external TTS measurements from atransmitting apparatus comprising at least one of the first dataprocessing apparatus and the intermediate device, wherein thetransmitting apparatus is configured to determine the one or moreexternal TTS measurements by applying at least one of a scalingfunction, identity function, assignment function, step function,artificial neural network, and machine learning techniques to the one ormore signals received by the transmitting apparatus from the at leastone of the one or more first sensors and the one or more second sensors;perform a first check comparing the one or more external TTSmeasurements against at least one value defined by at least one TTSrule; pass the first check to obtain a first TTS state; and afterpassing the first check, adjust, by the second processor, the operatingsecurity state of the second data processing apparatus to implement thefirst TTS state by performing at least one of: loading a communicationmethod configuration, enabling a keystore access, enabling an incomingcommunication, enabling an outgoing communication, enabling acommunication request notification, establishing a communication with anendpoint, causing hardware actions on the second data processingapparatus, causing first application specific behavior actions, enablinga first feature of the second data processing apparatus, and enabling asecond feature of an application on the second data processingapparatus; wherein the transmitting apparatus is configured to determineat least two TTS measurements from the one or more signals, wherein eachTTS measurements is determined independently of any other TTSmeasurement; wherein the transmitting apparatus is further configured todetermine a third TTS measurements by combining the at least two TTSmeasurements; wherein the transmitting apparatus is further configuredto determine one of the at least two TTS measurements using data from atleast one TTS rule, wherein the data comprises one or more of ahistorical TTS measurement and a historical value for one of the one ormore signals used in determining one of the at least two TTSmeasurements; and wherein machine learning techniques are used todetermine if the transmitting apparatus is currently operating in one ofa typical way and an atypical way.
 13. The system of claim 12, whereinthe communication request notification comprises at least one of aringer and haptic feedback.
 14. The system of claim 12, wherein thehardware actions caused on the second data processing apparatus compriseat least one of: a screen lock, shutdown, device wipe, vibration,graphical, visual screen notification, visual indicator light, and noisenotification.
 15. The system of claim 12, wherein at least one of theone or more first sensors and the one or more of second sensors furthercomprise a remote sensor located externally to the transmittingapparatus and located on the second data processing apparatus.
 16. Thesystem of claim 12, wherein the one or more first sensors comprises atleast one of: an accelerometer; gyroscope; ambient light sensor; devicescreen backlight level sensor; audio sensor; audio sensor withmicrophone; GPS unit; a location providing sensor; a position providingsensor; a camera; WiFi; cellular; packet radio; data radio; voice radio;Bluetooth; thermometer; barometer; biometric input; Near FieldCommunication (NFC) sensor; camera; proximity sensor; radiation,chemical, or biological detector; biomechanics sensor; biomedicalsensor; electric or magnetic field sensor; electromagnetic spectrumanalyzer; electromagnetic signal detector; infrared sensor; infraredcamera; sonar imaging; sonar range finder; laser range finder; softwaresensors including values provided by device hardware, operating system,and other sensors regarding a current operational state andconfiguration of a device; and wherein the one or more second sensorscomprises at least one of: an accelerometer; gyroscope; ambient lightsensor; device screen backlight level sensor; audio sensor; audio sensorwith microphone; GPS unit; a location providing sensor; a positionproviding sensor; a camera; WiFi; cellular; packet radio; data radio;voice radio; Bluetooth; thermometer; barometer; biometric input; NearField Communication (NFC) sensor; camera; proximity sensor; radiation,chemical, or biological detector; biomechanics sensor; biomedicalsensor; electric or magnetic field sensor; electromagnetic spectrumanalyzer; electromagnetic signal detector; infrared sensor; infraredcamera; sonar imaging; sonar range finder; laser range finder; softwaresensors including values provided by device hardware, operating system,and other sensors regarding a current operational state andconfiguration of a device.
 17. A computer-readable medium storingcomputer instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause a firstdata processing apparatus to perform steps comprising: receiving one ormore signals from one or more sensors; determining varying levels oftrust, security, and access by applying at least one of a scalingfunction, identity function, assignment function, step function,artificial neural network, and machine learning techniques to the one ormore signals from the one or more sensors to determine a TTSmeasurement; determining, by the first data processing apparatus, atleast two trust levels from the one or more signals, wherein each trustlevel is determined independently of any other trust level; determining,by the first data processing apparatus, a third trust level by combiningthe at least two trust levels; changing a first operating security stateof the first data processing apparatus to a second operating securitystate by at least one of control, direction, manipulation, limitation,activation, and deactivation of at least one of a plurality of operatingsecurity states of the first data processing apparatus; and transmittingthe TTS measurement to a second data processing apparatus; wherein thechanging from the first operating security state to the second operatingsecurity state occurs using first tailored trustworthy space rules (“TTSrules”) and the TTS measurement; wherein determining, by the first dataprocessing apparatus, one of the at least two trust levels furthercomprises: using data from at least one TTS rule, wherein the datacomprises one or more of a historical trust level and a historical valuefor one of the one or more signals used in determining one of the atleast two trust levels; wherein machine learning techniques are used todetermine if the first data processing apparatus is currently operatingin one of a typical way and an atypical way; and wherein the second dataprocessing apparatus is configured to change its operating securitystate using both the TTS measurement received from the first dataprocessing apparatus and a second TTS rules tailored for the second dataprocessing apparatus, wherein the second data processing apparatuschanging its operating security states comprises at least one:termination of communication with the first data processing apparatus,screen lock of the second data processing apparatus, shutdown of thesecond data processing apparatus, device wipe of the second dataprocessing apparatus, vibration of the second data processing apparatus,graphical screen notification on the second data processing apparatus,flashing of a visual indicator light of the second data processingapparatus, and noise notification on the second data processingapparatus.
 18. The computer-readable medium of claim 17, wherein a firstsensor of the one or more sensors is at least one of: a remote sensorlocated externally to the first data processing apparatus, an output ofthe TTS measurement, and an electromagnetic spectrum sensor configuredto detect a presence of unauthorized electronic devices.